Moldova’s EU path is gaining momentum. Its political foundations remain fragile

Reform can move faster than political consensus

The fundamentals cluster puts some of the hardest work near the beginning. It covers the rule of law and fundamental rights, democratic institutions, public administration reform and economic criteria. Progress depends on benchmarks, not political declarations alone.

That pressure can itself strengthen the state.

Stegarescu argues that accession conditionality can force authorities to implement reforms that are concrete and verifiable even when domestic politics become more confrontational. Stronger institutions and greater political vulnerability, in his view, are not opposite outcomes. They can develop at the same time.

He also sees the reform process as difficult to stop in the near term, pointing to the parliamentary majority held by the pro-European PAS. That majority gives the government room to keep the accession agenda moving through the current political cycle.

But institutional control does not remove political risk. Stegarescu’s assessment is that each visible step bringing Moldova closer to EU membership tends to provoke a new wave of resistance from anti-European and pro-Russian parts of society. Progress can therefore create its own counter-pressure.

That becomes more important if Moldova and Ukraine eventually begin moving at different speeds. A faster Moldovan track would bring political rewards, but it would also raise expectations that Chișinău can deliver reforms on schedule. Every successful step would make the European course more tangible while giving its opponents another moment around which to mobilise.

Moldovan institutions are already working under several kinds of pressure. Stegarescu points to cyberattacks, waves of bots on social networks, drone incidents, Russian pressure and the unresolved Transnistrian issue. His assessment is not that Moldova has stopped progressing. It is that resilience remains limited while the demands placed on the state continue to accumulate.

“Moldova can become institutionally stronger while its political consensus around European integration remains fragile.”

The weak point is political support

The 2024 constitutional referendum showed how narrow that consensus could be. On 20 October, 749,719 valid votes were cast for the constitutional amendment and 739,155 against it - 50.35% to 49.65%. The amendment passed by only 10,564 votes.

For Stegarescu, that makes political and social support the most vulnerable part of the accession process. Reforms can be adopted under external pressure and checked against benchmarks, but they still have to be implemented by institutions working in a deeply polarised environment.

The problem is not simply whether Moldova can pass another law, meet another benchmark or open another cluster. It is whether support for the European project becomes broad enough for those changes to survive electoral competition.

Brussels can measure legislation, administrative capacity and alignment with the acquis. It cannot create political consensus inside Moldova. A government can become better at meeting accession requirements while a future election still reopens the argument over the country’s direction.

In practice, progress in Brussels can outpace political consolidation at home. The institutional process has visible markers: clusters, benchmarks, legislation and implementation. The political process is harder to measure. It is about whether European integration stops belonging mainly to one camp and becomes difficult for a future government to reverse.

Stegarescu also links this vulnerability to the wider pressure surrounding Moldova’s political system. External interference and information pressure matter, but they work through divisions that already exist. Resilience is therefore not only about blocking hostile activity. It also depends on whether enough citizens see the European course as compatible with their own political and economic expectations.

The larger test comes after Maia Sandu

The next negotiating cluster will matter. For Stegarescu, however, it will not be the decisive proof that Moldova’s European course has become durable.

He places that test further ahead: political succession after President Maia Sandu. Sandu began her second term on 24 December 2024. Her eventual departure will test whether the country’s strategic direction can survive a change in the political figure most closely associated with it.

Stegarescu considers continuity under another pro-European president a key indicator that Moldova’s European trajectory has moved beyond dependence on one leader or one electoral cycle. If the country can change leadership without reopening the basic question of whether it belongs on the European path, accession begins to look more like a durable state trajectory than a project associated with a particular government.

He also proposes a more immediate indicator.

Rather than looking only at voters who already support accession, he would watch whether part of the 49.65% who voted “No” in 2024 can be brought toward the opposite position. In his assessment, attracting even around ten percent of that group over the next year would significantly improve the chances that Moldova’s European course survives future electoral cycles.

That ten-percent figure is Stegarescu’s own analytical threshold, not an official target. The point behind it is more important than the number itself. Durability will depend less on mobilising voters who already favour the EU than on shrinking the group for whom European integration remains unacceptable.

Moldova does not need political unanimity before joining the European Union. What it needs is a European trajectory strong enough that an election can change the government without automatically threatening to change the country’s strategic direction.

The opening of two negotiating clusters shows how quickly the institutional process can move when political conditions are in place. The harder test will take longer. Moldova’s European course will become genuinely resilient when progress in Brussels no longer depends on the same political coalition continuing to win at home.

Expert contribution

This analysis draws on a written exchange with Bogdan Stegarescu, an intern at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute and a recent SNSPA graduate whose work focuses on the Republic of Moldova, post-Soviet political analysis and institutional resilience. His views are attributed throughout the article.