Romania is acting more firmly in the Black Sea. That does not yet make a strategy

A more active Romania, but still a reactive one

Preda does not see Romania moving away from NATO, the EU or its strategic partnership with the United States. He sees the need for something additional: a Romanian policy for the Black Sea built around interests that Bucharest increasingly has to protect itself.

Neptun Deep makes that argument more concrete. The offshore gas project is moving toward production in 2027, placing valuable energy infrastructure in a maritime environment already exposed to war, drifting mines and repeated drone incidents. On 11 August, Romanian military divers destroyed two unidentified Gerbera-type drones found near the project after they were reported by a civilian vessel. Their origin has not been established.

For Romania, Black Sea security is therefore becoming harder to treat simply as an alliance responsibility or as a consequence of the war next door.

Preda sees Romania's long hesitation over drone incursions as a useful measure of the problem: it took years for Bucharest to move from surveillance to actual interception. The new corvette is another useful step, but ships and aircraft matter strategically only when they are connected to a clearer idea of what Romania wants to protect and what role it intends to play.

That also requires diplomacy. Preda argues that a more serious Black Sea policy should combine military capability with stronger regional cooperation rather than relying on procurement alone. Romania's work with Bulgaria and Türkiye already offers one practical model: their joint mine-countermeasures mission has expanded beyond drifting mines to include critical infrastructure protection.

“Romania does not have to change camps to become less consequential for Ukraine. It only has to become slower, more selective and less willing to support new decisions.”

The more difficult constraint may be domestic

Geography limits Romania's autonomy. It sits beside an active war, on NATO's Eastern Flank and under continued pressure from Russia. Preda therefore sees multilateral security guarantees as indispensable for a country of Romania's size.

But he considers Romania's internal condition just as important.

Political and economic instability, weak confidence in state institutions and the growing challenge to the country's established Euro-Atlantic consensus all reduce the room for a more ambitious foreign policy. In Preda's view, the missing resource may ultimately be political will: a greater willingness in Bucharest to define Romanian interests clearly and accept the costs of defending them.

The sovereigntist challenge is also becoming harder to dismiss. AUR has established itself as a major force in Romanian politics and in August launched a dedicated platform supporting an effort to suspend President Nicușor Dan.

The significance is not that Romania is suddenly about to abandon its Western alliances. It is that foreign policy itself is becoming a more visible arena of domestic political competition.

That matters particularly for Ukraine.

Romania does not have to change sides to step back

Preda sees Romania's future position toward Ukraine and the Black Sea as closely tied to who governs in Bucharest after 2028, or potentially earlier.

Under another pro-European and pro-Western majority, he expects broad continuity. A sovereigntist government would create a different possibility, especially if the war in Ukraine remains prolonged and politically exhausting. The most negative scenario, in which openly pro-Russian figures gain control of government, is one he considers less likely.

The more plausible risk is quieter.

Romania does not have to change camps to become less consequential for Ukraine. It only has to become slower, more selective and less willing to support new decisions.

A government could remain committed to NATO and EU membership while reducing political initiative, becoming more cautious about military assistance or avoiding additional regional responsibilities. That would amount to disengagement without geopolitical reversal.

Yet Romania's own interests make such disengagement increasingly difficult. Neptun Deep, offshore infrastructure, commercial shipping, Romanian airspace and the country's exclusive economic zone all connect Bucharest more directly to what happens in the Black Sea. The closer these assets move to the centre of Romania's economic and security calculations, the higher the cost of a passive regional policy becomes.

The August drone incident near Neptun Deep is a particularly clear reminder that infrastructure protection cannot be separated from the broader security environment.

For Preda, a genuine strategic shift would therefore be visible not in another speech but in a pattern: stronger protection of Neptun Deep, continued naval modernisation, firmer responses to incursions and sustained regional diplomacy. He also raises the possibility of a practical Balkan cooperation format adapted to today's security conditions, as an additional layer rather than an alternative to NATO, the EU or the United States.

Romania is already being pushed toward a larger Black Sea role by geography, war and its own economic interests. The unresolved question is whether Bucharest can turn that pressure into a policy before domestic political fragmentation makes hesitation a lasting feature of Romanian foreign policy.

Expert contribution

This analysis draws on a written exchange with Adrian Eugen Preda, PhD in Political Science and Teaching Assistant at Constantin Brâncuși University of Târgu Jiu. His views are attributed throughout the article.