Romania’s counter-UAS capabilities: its current problems.
Romania has witnessed in the last few weeks a series of drone incursions into its airspace, with the most recent one on the 12 of September bringing the tally to 27 drone incursions. To show just how drastically things have changed we can take a look at the current year and compare it to the previous one: in 2025 it was only once every 2 weeks that Russian drones made incursions into the Romanian airspace or hovered along its borders, in 2026 Romania witnesses on average 2 incidents per week. More recently, Russia has switched its area of incursions from the South along the Danube Delta to the Far North and North East at the border with the Republic of Moldova. This creates a series of problems among which is the distance between the nearest aerodrome from which fighter jets can scramble and the entry point of the drone. Currently the nearest one is at 300 km, leading to a delayed interception time. This creates at least 2 serious security issues for the nation:
• First, Romania does not have enough detection and counter-UAS systems to cover the entire border and the recent acquisitions such as the MEROP systems are too far and few to even cover the narrower corridor in the Danube Delta, let alone the entirety of the Romania-Moldova-Ukraine border.
• Second, besides the lack of complete coverage, another issue has been raised throughout several media outlets and academic circles and that is the problem of cost-effectiveness of the usage of the F-16s to take down the Russian drones.
Key takeaways
- Russian drone incursions have shifted from the Danube Delta towards Romania’s northern and north-eastern borders, exposing gaps in radar coverage and interception distance.
- Romania is acquiring MEROP, Skyranger, Skynex and Ground Master systems, but delivery and operationalisation will take years and interim support remains necessary.
- Sustainable defence will depend on lower-cost interception, wider regional coordination and closer cooperation with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.
What has been done?
What has Romania done to improve its capabilities to detect and neutralize Russian drones? So far, the Ministry of Defense has made strides in this regard, even if a bit too late due to shameful incidents such as Angel Tîlvăr’s denial of the first incidents of Russian drone incursions. On an administrative and strategic level, according to an interview with the Minister of Defense Radu Miruta, the Romanian Ministry of Defense has, together with intelligence services and other defence related institutions, worked behind the scenes to flesh out a chain of responsibility in countering threats depending on the circumstances of the incidents they are facing. Another strategic milestone is the revision and renewal of the Plan for the arming of the Romanian Armed Forces for the period 2027-2036 with the Programme of rearmament of the Romanian Army until 2044 aimed at tackling the recent threats towards national integrity and sovereignty, although it is yet to be seen what steps will be taken and how it will materialize. Furthermore, according to Radu Miruta, Romania is engaged in several contracts within the SAFE framework that will lead to several lines of production of various types of drones being built in Romania, from which Romanian MOD experts will learn the craft of drone-making. Lastly, Romania has started the process of initiating contracts with Ukraine for experience and intelligence sharing on drone production and counter-UAS practices.
When it comes to actual acquisitions and mobilizing units and systems along the border, the Romanian Ministry of Defense has made several investments in that regard. Besides the MEROPs, the MOD has purchased 24 Skyrangers from Rheinmetall which due to its modularity be can applied to several types of chassis and with various sensors. In addition to these Skyrangers, Romania has also purchased seven stationary Skynex systems, which are highly modular and can be integrated with various command and control units. Both are short- to very short-range anti-air systems with an effective range up to 4 km. These systems are combined with new detection technology, such as the 12 recently purchased Ground Master 200 MMAs that have a detection range of up to 350 km. However, for both the Sky-systems and the Ground Master radars, their delivery and operationalization are estimated to take several years in several phases, especially since some delays have been declared in the case of the former. To make up for that problem, Radu Miruta presented the issue in front of all of the 32 Generals of NATO member armies, explaining why Romania needs support and that it has the right to ask for it. This has led to Slovakia sending several radars and radar operator teams to use them to temporarily meet Romania's radar coverage needs while the delivery of the previously mentioned systems is being made.
Finally, one of the main critiques of the current usage of F-16s to take down drones is the exorbitant costs that will drain Romania of its resources long-term. To exemplify, an AIM-9X Sidewinder that was possibly used to take down the drones costs 450 000 dollars per piece, which is highly uneconomical, and it will only encourage the Russians to intensify their attacks. On the other hand, a MEROPs drone will only cost about 15,000 dollars, with the price expected to drop gradually to 3000 dollars, while the Skyranger 35 munitions will cost approximately 4,000 dollars per drone takedown. As such, it is in Romania’s best interest to quickly acquire and produce as many low-cost systems as possible to efficiently counter Russia’s drone incursions sustainably.
“As such, it is in Romania’s best interest to quickly acquire and produce as many low-cost systems as possible to efficiently counter Russia’s drone incursions sustainably.”
First steps have been taken, but a long road lies ahead.
So far, the Romanian Ministry of Defense has been actively and successfully mobilizing all of its resources to achieve maximum capabilities to counter the Russian drone incursions into the Romanian airspace. That being said, until recently, most of the incidents were focused on the narrow area of the Danube Delta, where the high density of radar and anti-UAS systems allows for proper defence against most threats. Now Russians have expanded their theatres to the Republic of Moldova and the northern border between Romania and Ukraine, creating a significantly larger area that can not be so easily covered by fighter jets and other systems.
To conclude, considering the changing entry points of Russian drones into the Romanian airspace, there needs to be a serious adjustment of the positions of all relevant systems in order to counteract the hybrid war that Russia has been waging in the region. Furthermore, strategic measures need to be taken, such as the conclusion of an agreement between Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine to counter the Russian drone incursions in the region, akin to the current Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group Missions between Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. As a result of the previously mentioned agreements, Romania could try to implement, together with its Moldovan and Ukrainian partners, more “hybrid” measures against Russian drones that would send a clear signal to the Kremlin to stop its incursions. However, in the meantime, the Romanian MOD can only try to spread its capabilities as efficiently as possible to minimize the damage caused by Russia’s hybrid war.



