From data centres to living rooms
Russia's 23 September strikes on Kyiv damaged internet providers and data centres used to carry traffic or host services. Ukraine's Digital Transformation Ministry reported internet problems for about 100,000 households in Kyiv and the surrounding region. The figure describes households whose service deteriorated, not 100,000 disconnected customers throughout Ukraine. Providers reported damage to core equipment, power and network nodes, so one hit could affect users far from the building itself.
The spread of problems followed the physical links between providers. UTELS said a Kyiv facility holding core equipment lost power; Pavutyna reported a hit to one of its data centres; and Crazy Network said damage to a traffic exchange interrupted internet and telephone service in Kyiv and two other regions, according to provider accounts collected by the Kyiv Independent. That sequence explains why a strike on a building could reach domestic connections. It does not establish that every affected household depended on the same provider or failed component.
“Backups saved data at Cosmonova, but its damaged site still interrupted video players used by Ukraine's public broadcaster.”
Key takeaways
- Damage to shared provider facilities reached households because several networks depended on equipment and traffic routes at the affected sites. Around 100,000 Kyiv-area households experienced internet problems after the 23 September strikes.
- Separate backups preserved Cosmonova's customer data, yet its damaged infrastructure still interrupted some video players used by Ukraine's public broadcaster. Another newsroom lost its television signal while its website and social channels remained available.
- Ukraine's new protection decisions have not yet been described in enough detail to assess. Their practical test is shorter local outages and faster restoration after subsequent strikes, with essential news channels remaining reachable.
What stayed online, and what stopped
On 24 September, Ukraine's communications regulator said providers were completing emergency repairs and warned that further temporary interruptions were possible as Russia continued its attacks. Suspilne later reported that Russian strikes damaged Cosmonova's network and data centre. The company said geographical backups preserved all customer data, but services could still falter while engineers moved them to reserve locations. After a second hit on 26 September, Cosmonova said the damaged data centre would no longer operate.
The effect was visible on Suspilne's own site: some video players temporarily failed. Novyny.Live reported that its television signal was temporarily unavailable after the attacks, while its website, Telegram and YouTube channels remained accessible. These are specific failures in distributing news, not proof that Ukrainian media as a whole went offline. They also show why a saved copy of a file is only part of continuity: audiences need working connections, delivery systems and a way to reach the service.
Suspilne's interviews with providers found that Pavutyna recovered in under a day after an earlier decision to keep copies of key data outside Ukraine. A parliamentary telecoms official told the broadcaster that, as of 23 September, he had received no report of a government institution stopping work. He said state bodies used different, protected communications networks. Those observations limit the conclusion: Russia caused serious local disruption, but the available reporting does not establish a failed national warning system or a nationwide internet blackout.
The protection test
Russia's Defence Ministry claimed that the struck facilities served Ukrainian military communications. The Kyiv Independent could not verify that claim. The confirmed civilian effects deserve scrutiny regardless of Moscow's account: households lost reliable access, providers had to repair or reroute service, and newsrooms lost specific ways to deliver video or television. Russia is responsible for the strikes during its invasion of Ukraine.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced additional protection decisions on 25 September, but did not publish a site-by-site plan or performance target for internet facilities. Independent assessment must therefore follow observable results rather than assume the measures work. Relevant measures include how many households lose service after a comparable strike, how long providers need to restore connections, and whether public-interest media can keep publishing through a separate route. Providers may withhold the locations of reserve equipment for security, so the test need not expose their physical defences.
The attacks from 23 to 26 September propagated through shared network sites into home connections and particular media services. Geographically separate copies helped preserve data and speed at least one provider's recovery, while Cosmonova's outages showed that stored data can outlast the delivery path. Ukraine's announced protection will be working if later strikes produce fewer affected households, shorter local interruptions and continuous access to essential news channels. A repeat of the same failures, despite the new measures, would change that assessment.
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Mara Ionescu
Research ContributorInformation resilience, foreign influence narratives, and regional security in Romania, Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova.
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