Ukraine’s anti-corruption inquiry must continue if Kravchenko leaves office

What investigators have disclosed

On 5 September, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office published an account of Operation Carthage. They alleged that a department head in the Prosecutor General’s Office had formed a criminal organisation in mid-2025. According to NABU’s official account, the group accepted bribes in return for leaving fraudulent call centres undisturbed and then concealed proceeds through property, valuables, third-party ownership and associates’ bank accounts.

NABU said five alleged participants had been identified and that work to identify others continued. It described more than UAH 20 million in purchases, over UAH 12 million in assets registered to third parties and more than UAH 10 million placed in associates’ accounts. Those categories may overlap, so they should not be presented as a single proven total. They remain investigators’ allegations, not judicial findings.

The investigation reached offices used by senior officials. The Prosecutor General’s Office confirmed searches of premises used by Kravchenko, First Deputy Prosecutor General Mariia Vdowychenko and other employees. Yet NABU’s public release did not name Kravchenko as the alleged organiser or say that he was a suspect. The prosecution service argued that material cited in the search warrant did not directly show him protecting call centres, obstructing investigators, receiving criminal proceeds or financing household work with illicit money.

Kravchenko denied receiving or laundering money linked to call centres and offered lawful explanations for his family’s spending and recorded discussions about work on a house. Separately, the High Anti-Corruption Court placed senior prosecutor Serhii Kropyva in custody until 2 November, with bail set at UAH 120 million. That preventive measure addresses risks during proceedings. It does not determine guilt.

Continuity depends on who controls the case

If Kravchenko’s resignation is accepted, NABU and SAPO will need uninterrupted lawful access to records, relevant personnel and witnesses. Investigators should be able to pursue links beyond the five disclosed suspects when evidence supports doing so. They must also close lines of inquiry that the evidence does not support, including any concerning Kravchenko personally.

“A leadership change should not change who controls the evidence or which investigators remain on the case.”

The Prosecutor General’s Office has raised a separate concern about investigators accessing material connected to possible misconduct by NABU and SAPO personnel. Public information cannot establish whether this was a legitimate confidentiality dispute, an institutional counterattack or some combination of the two. Courts and documented procedures should resolve the scope of access. An unexplained transfer of jurisdiction, removal of investigators or loss of records would indicate that the inquiry had been disrupted.

Any successor will affect the conditions

If another official takes permanent charge, the appointment alone will say little about the independence of the inquiry. That official could protect or weaken the conditions under which evidence is gathered. Ukraine and the European Commission have already committed to protecting NABU and SAPO jurisdiction and conducting a comprehensive review of how the Prosecutor General is selected and dismissed.

Published selection criteria, a documented integrity assessment and clear reasons for the final choice would reduce the risk that any successor is judged mainly by political loyalty. The same due-process rule applies to the present inquiry. Officials should neither treat Kravchenko’s resignation request as exoneration nor use it as a substitute for proving allegations.

The European Commission has assessed Ukraine partly through its record of high-level cases, including investigations, indictments and judgments. A credible outcome here therefore requires more than searches or a possible resignation. Authorities should eventually provide enough procedural explanation to show why charges were filed, narrowed or closed, without releasing material that would compromise the case.

The investigation and any leadership transition would demonstrate accountability if NABU and SAPO retain access to evidence and witnesses, courts examine the allegations, and investigators follow the evidence beyond the five disclosed suspects without presuming anyone’s guilt. If a successor is appointed, a transparent, merit-based process and continued respect for anti-corruption jurisdiction would strengthen that judgment. Public reasons for eventual charges, closure decisions or judgments would strengthen it further. Withheld records, unexplained transfers or an opaque appointment would point in the opposite direction. The only confirmed development is that Kravchenko submitted a resignation during an active investigation. His guilt remains unproven, and the institutions have not yet completed their work.