Ukraine's next election needs a published readiness test

The electorate is larger than the available poll

Public opinion does not show a mandate for immediate voting. In a July survey published on 5 August, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that 15 per cent supported elections before a ceasefire. Another 23 per cent favoured voting after a ceasefire backed by reliable security guarantees, while 57 per cent preferred to wait for a final peace agreement and the complete end of the war.

Those figures require a clear qualification. The telephone survey covered 974 adults living in government-controlled Ukraine. It excluded people who moved abroad after the full-scale invasion and those remaining in occupied territory. These are among the citizens an actual election would have the greatest difficulty reaching. Approximately five million Ukrainians live in EU member states, while many others are serving in the military or have moved within Ukraine. A credible vote requires these groups to have a materially equal chance to register, campaign, obtain reliable information and cast a ballot.

“A credible vote requires soldiers, refugees and displaced citizens to have a materially equal chance to participate.”

Security is one of several tests

Protecting polling stations would not resolve the entire democratic problem. Candidates need a meaningful opportunity to organise and travel. Voters need access to competing media and trustworthy election information. Domestic and international observers need access to the process. Courts and election authorities need time and capacity to hear complaints. Citizens abroad need agreements with host governments, secure polling locations and registration arrangements that go beyond the normal reach of embassies and consulates.

Ukraine and its European partners have already begun defining this work. An April joint statement from Ukrainian institutions and the Council of Europe set the objective of post-war elections after a sustainable peace. It identified voting rights for displaced people, military personnel and citizens abroad, along with protection against disinformation and foreign interference. That official preparation shows why “security” cannot serve as shorthand for every unresolved condition.

A delayed election does not remove other forms of accountability. Parliament, independent media, anti-corruption bodies and courts remain necessary channels of accountability while Russia's attacks prevent normal voting. Publishing election-readiness criteria would add another check. It would allow citizens to see whether the Central Election Commission, parliament and foreign partners are solving identifiable problems or simply invoking the war without reporting progress.

What would change the judgment

Ukraine cannot hold a democratically credible national election today. Current law prohibits it, no public security arrangement yet offers predictable safety nationwide, and no public plan yet offers materially equal participation to soldiers, refugees, displaced people and citizens affected by occupation. The judgment should change when five conditions are documented: a lawful end to martial law, a sustained security arrangement, a detailed implementation plan for excluded electorates, host-state agreements for voting abroad, and credible provisions for observation and disputes. Publishing those tests now would not commit Ukraine to a premature polling date. It would make the eventual decision evidence-based and give Ukrainians a way to judge whether delay remains justified.