Ukraine’s sanctions on Masha and the Bear face a platform test

What Kyiv has put in place

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed four sanctions decrees on 20 August. According to the Presidential Office, one part of the package covers five Russian citizens and four organisations involved in creating and distributing Masha and the Bear. The designated parties include Animaccord and people connected to the series’ production, management and rights.

The relevant legal act, Decree No. 744/2026, entered into force on publication and put the National Security and Defence Council decision into effect. It assigned implementation and monitoring to the Cabinet of Ministers, the Security Service of Ukraine and the National Bank. It also instructed the Foreign Ministry to ask the European Union, the United States and other states to adopt comparable restrictions. That diplomatic instruction is important because it marks the boundary of Ukrainian authority: Kyiv can establish a legal case and enforce it at home, while action abroad requires other governments or companies to agree.

Culture Minister Tetyana Berezhna said the measures create legal grounds to block the content in Ukraine and approach international platforms about restrictions on monetisation and distribution. The government may request blocking of Ukrainian-, Russian- and English-language versions on YouTube and other services. As of 22 August, however, none of the sources reviewed for this article showed that a major international platform had announced a block, demonetisation decision or geographic restriction. The sanction is therefore an operative legal tool, but its cross-border effects remain unproven.

“Kyiv can create a legal basis for enforcement at home. Reducing the series’ reach or revenue abroad still depends on platforms and foreign partners.”

Why distribution matters more than the cartoon debate

The scale of the distribution network explains why Ukrainian authorities treated the series as more than an old television product. A 2025 analysis by Detector Media, based on Sub Sub data, found that the adapted Ukrainian-language channel ranked first among 20 children’s channels presented as Ukrainian and had accumulated more than 800 million views in 2025. The channel listed Ukraine in its description while linking to a .ru website and a VK page. Those figures measure views, not unique Ukrainian children, and they do not reveal where the advertising income ultimately went. They do establish that localisation preserved substantial reach for a Russian-owned media product.

This makes ownership, availability and payment flows more useful tests than a debate over hidden messages in individual episodes. Ukrainian officials describe the series as a vehicle for pro-Russian narratives aimed at children. Animaccord denies Russian state funding and calls the propaganda allegation false. The available evidence does not demonstrate that exposure changes children’s political attitudes. Ukraine’s narrower case is easier to assess. During Russia’s war of aggression, a Russian-owned media product retains substantial reach among Ukrainian-language viewers, while Detector Media’s analysis indicates that its owners may earn income through the localised channel.

The platform test

For YouTube and other services, compliance requires more than removing a title from search results. A platform would need to identify the sanctioned beneficiaries, determine which channels and language versions they control, trace monetisation arrangements and decide where any restriction applies. A Ukrainian-language channel can look local to viewers even when the underlying media product remains Russian-owned. Without disclosure from the platform, neither the Ukrainian government nor the public can tell whether a geoblock has reduced access, whether advertising has stopped, or whether revenue has shifted through another rights holder.

Foreign partners also face a choice about proportionality. Ukraine has a legitimate interest in preventing sanctioned Russian businesses from earning revenue in its market during Russia’s invasion. European and US authorities will still need evidence connecting each designated person or company to the activity they are being asked to restrict. Clear explanations of the ownership chain, the applicable sanction and the requested platform action would give partners a concrete basis for deciding whether their own laws support matching measures. They would also distinguish a targeted wartime sanction from an open-ended prohibition on Russian culture.

The sanctions can give Ukrainian authorities a legal basis to restrict domestic distribution, assets and commercial relationships. Their wider effect depends on whether platforms identify the beneficiaries and apply visible restrictions, and whether foreign partners adopt compatible measures. The present judgment would change if platforms disclosed blocking or demonetisation, partners imposed matching sanctions, or audited data showed where Ukrainian viewing revenue goes. Until then, the only confirmed result is a new Ukrainian legal basis for enforcement.