Three attacks in six days

During Russia’s large-scale attack on Ukraine on the night of 19–20 August, Russian forces targeted a road crossing on the Moldovan border. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said Russian drones also violated Moldovan and Romanian airspace. He described the incidents as part of a wider effort by Moscow to test NATO and its partners and expand the risks created by its war beyond Ukraine.

On the following night, Shahed drones damaged buildings and other structures at Tabaky, an international road crossing in Odesa Oblast. Ukraine suspended passenger and vehicle processing and redirected traffic to other checkpoints. On 22 August, the State Border Guard Service said Tabaky had reopened and Moldova had been informed.

Russia attacked again early on 25 August. At 02:51, Moldova’s Air Operations Service warned the Border Police of a drone moving from Ukraine towards Moldova in the Vulcănești area. At 03:18, Ukrainian border guards informed their Moldovan counterparts that a Shahed had attacked the Vynohradivka checkpoint at 02:55. A Moldovan patrol then observed two further explosions at around 03:49. No fragments posing a public risk had been found on Moldovan territory by that morning.

The 25 August strike damaged infrastructure and started a fire. Ukraine closed Vynohradivka and redirected travellers elsewhere. Tabaky had resumed operations by the day after its attack. Vynohradivka’s reopening was announced late on 26 August, about 38 hours after the reported strike. The exact outage periods are not public because the announcements do not provide precise operational restart times.

These responses show that the agencies involved could contain fires, move traffic and restore basic service. That reduced the immediate interruption and prevented the loss of one checkpoint from closing the border. Public reporting does not say how many passengers or freight vehicles the alternative crossings absorbed, whether queues grew, or whether the reopened facilities returned to normal processing capacity.

Key takeaways

  • Russia struck Ukraine–Moldova border infrastructure three times in six days. The later two attacks temporarily closed checkpoints and forced traffic onto alternative routes.
  • Tabaky reopened the following day, while Vynohradivka’s reopening was announced about 38 hours after the reported attack. Neither announcement included restored-capacity or queue data.
  • Moldova has begun protection works at several vulnerable crossings and announced further shelter, evacuation and warning measures. Their coverage and performance have not yet been reported.

What reopening does not measure

Those missing figures matter because the border forms part of a larger wartime trade route. Since May 2022, the EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes have carried nearly 230 million tonnes of Ukrainian exports and around 111 million tonnes of imports. The Commission estimates the total value of trade through the lanes at around €304 billion. It does not provide a checkpoint-level breakdown, but the scale explains why reopening time alone cannot establish the effect of repeated attacks on border traffic.

Public reporting gives no restored-throughput figure for Tabaky or Vynohradivka. It does not state the warning time required before processing stops, how many people can reach shelter, the spare capacity available on diversion routes, or the repair target for essential control systems. Without these measures, a brief closure with little economic effect cannot be distinguished from a nominal reopening marked by long queues, reduced inspections or exposed personnel.

Without restored-throughput data, reopening time is only a partial measure of continuity.

On 22 August, after the first two strikes, Moldova’s Interior Ministry announced a package of planned protections. These include identifying shelter spaces, developing evacuation and suspension procedures, preparing guidance for green-border patrols, replenishing medical and protective stocks, relocating fuel from high-risk areas and coordinating earlier warnings with the Defence Ministry. Construction and arrangement work had begun at several crossings considered vulnerable, while wider implementation was to proceed according to risk assessments.

The package addresses concrete dangers to border staff, travellers and nearby patrols. Its effectiveness will depend on coverage and performance. Ukraine and Moldova could report aggregate results without disclosing air-defence positions or exploitable details: the interval between an alert and suspension of processing, the share of personnel and travellers with shelter access, the time needed to activate diversion routes, the duration of essential repairs, and the percentage of normal throughput available after 12 and 24 hours.

The Institute for the Study of War assessed the three strikes as part of a wider Russian campaign against Ukrainian logistics, including ports and routes used for trade with Europe. That is an analytical inference about Russian intent, not proof of target selection in each operation. The observed actions are not in doubt: Russia, the aggressor in its war against Ukraine, repeatedly damaged civilian border infrastructure connecting Ukraine with Moldova and the EU.

Rapid repairs and rerouting provided a useful emergency response to the later two strikes. Adequate continuity cannot yet be established from reopening announcements because they omit safety coverage, diversion capacity and restored throughput. The judgment would change if Ukraine and Moldova published consistent aggregate data showing timely warnings, protected staff and travellers, alternative crossings able to absorb displaced traffic, and recovery to normal or defined minimum capacity after repeated Russian attacks.

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Mara Ionescu

Mara Ionescu

Research Contributor

Information resilience, foreign influence narratives, and regional security in Romania, Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova.

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